## Mr. George gives an assessment of where the UK economy has come from and where it is headed
Speech by the Governor of the Bank of England, Mr. E.A.J. George, given at the Insti Directors Annual Dinner in London on 19/11/98.
My Lord and President, Deputy Lord Mayor, Your Excellency, My Lords, Ladies an Gentlemen.
Let me put some of the recent newspaper headlines alongside the facts, in order to put perspective.
First, on the world economy, the headlines read:
- Meltdown warning in the wake of economic slowdown.
- Last ditch bid to avert global crisis.
- G7 nations try to halt slide to depression.
And these are just the supposedly serious newspapers!
The facts are that world output growth is expected by the IMF to be 2% this year and 21 - compared with 4% in 1997. And the OECD expects growth in the OECD area of 21/4% th year, 13/4% in 1999, recovering to 21/4% in the year 2000 - compared with 3% in 1997. certainly is a very marked slowdown, but it is hardly meltdown or recession.
And on our own economy - the headlines read:
- Recession looms.
- The economy is hurtling headlong towards recession.
And even:
- It's official - the economy is shrinking.
The facts are that for the past 6½ years the British economy as a whole has grown at a annual rate of over 3% - which is well above its long term trend rate of some 2% - or, optimistic, some 2½%. And we were still growing, at an annual rate of some 2% in each last two quarters, on the latest published data.
At the time these headlines were written a month or so ago not one of the 28 inde professional forecasting organisations surveyed by Consensus Forecasts was expecting ou fall in 1999; and their average expectation was for 1% growth next year. That is broad with our own latest best guess in the MPC. Your own most recent IOD forecast in Sept suggested slightly stronger growth next year. It is true that Consensus Forecasts revised down their mean expectation - to just over ¾% growth; but even now only one of contributors expects output to fall.
On unemployment in the UK the headlines read:
* Jobs gloom deepens as layoffs soar.* More jobs go as recession looms.* Jobless up a pain hits Britain.
And the facts? At the time these headlines were written, the unemployment rate, both n and in virtually every region of the UK, apart from the South East and East Anglia, lowest it has been since at least the early 1980s.
## I could go on.
Headlines: UK heads for credit crisis. Closed for credit. Credit card sales dive. Fact building society lending up by 0.7% in the latest month (September) and by 8.8% over t year. Credit card lending was up by over 26% on a year ago.
Headlines: House prices hit as recession clouds gather. Facts: house prices rose by 6.7 past year on the Halifax index and by 7.5% according to the Nationwide.
Now I say all this, President, not to draw attention to the proclivity of headline writ economic/financial commentators, to sensationalise. My serious point is that, especiall of unusual uncertainty as at present, we all need to focus more carefully than ev evolving facts, and on the more probable outcomes and not allow ourselves to be preoccupied with extreme, even if possible, outcomes.
Against that background, let me offer you my own assessment of where the UK economy come from and where it is headed.
Since the recession of the early 1990s the economy as a whole has, as I say, grown at a annual rate of just over 3% - well above trend. During this period we were steadily re the spare capacity created by the recession, and this was reflected in a gradual impr the labour market - in a net increase in employment of 1.7 mn people since the end of in a persistent fall in unemployment to - as I say - the lowest rate for nearly 20 year underlying consumer price inflation has averaged 2.7% over the past 5 years, the low since the early 1960s - and it has been exactly on target - at 2½% - in each of the past
About 2 years ago it began to become evident that demand and output growth, in the econ a whole, was picking up speed. And as we moved into and through 1997, it became increa obvious that unless we acted to tighten monetary policy, in order to moderate the rate we risked overheating, particularly in the labour market, where reports of shortages skilled but even of unskilled workers, were becoming widespread.
The situation was seriously complicated by an increasing imbalance between the domest the internationally exposed sectors of the economy. Domestic demand for goods, and part for services, was unsustainably strong, and large parts of the economy were doing very the back of that - though they didn't make too much of a song and dance about it. B sectors, those most exposed to international competition - most of agriculture, larg manufacturing and some service sectors - were already then having a much more difficul Understandably, they were more vociferous. They had been hit, initially, by the exa strength of sterling against the major European currencies in the run up to decisions euro. And they were hit, subsequently, by the successive waves of turmoil spreading thr world economy which saw exchange rates fall and demand dry up in Asia and elsewhere.
So, faced with this dilemma, what were we to do? It is true that the external factors they were in a more fundamental sense, in terms of the imbalance in the economy - did restraining influence on overall aggregate demand and on inflation, and that meant somewhat more time than we would otherwise have had to moderate the growth of domes demand. But even allowing for that we in fact had no choice but to tighten policy.
It wasn't that we didn't know that the internationally-exposed sectors were under the we'd have had to be blind as well as deaf not to have known. Our problem was that if held back more than we did, in order to shelter the exposed sectors, we would have put economy - including the sectors we were trying to protect - at risk of accelerating in that would have meant eventually having to tighten policy more abruptly, which would more certainly have plunged the economy into serious recession, a bit further down the r
The harsh reality is that monetary policy can only target the economy as a whole realistically seek to shelter particular businesses or particular sectors or parti however much we might all wish it were otherwise. And, in relation to the economy as a the effective choice in the situation we faced was not whether or not to tighten, but tighten sooner, and by less, or later, by more.
So we raised interest rates through the second half of last year - and again in June we could through our tactics, to minimise any further unwanted upward pressure on sterli
## But things have now clearly moved on.
The outlook for the world economy deteriorated further through the summer under the imp a series of new shocks. Japan, the world's second largest economy, slipped further into Russia - which had only weeks earlier embarked on an IMF program - saw the collapse o rouble and default on its debt. And acute nervousness spread through many of the financial markets. Although there has been some improvement in sentiment over the past or two, and although the US and European economies continue to expand, the likelihood r that world economic growth will be significantly slower than had been expected earlie summer. Slower growth of world activity is bound to prolong the restraining external growth and inflation in the UK, even though the exchange rate has now started to weaken
At the same time there are also now clearer signs of overall slowdown in our own econom evidence for this is less obvious in the backwards-looking economic and monetary data t in the forward-looking surveys, but even so the data suggest that we are beginning easing of pressure, including an easing of pressure in the labour market. And the themselves now point to a slowdown in service sector growth, including retail distri well as a sharper decline in manufacturing output.
This prospect is consistent with the reports which we receive directly from the Bank's regional agents and their 7000-odd industrial and commercial contacts around the countr
Of course we pay very careful attention to this forward-looking evidence of development economy alongside the data, and, like others, we have revised down our forecasts fo growth and inflation. And we have eased monetary policy quite sharply in the past two in the light of that evidence.
Our current best guess - published in last week's Inflation Report is that, after the cuts, the growth of overall output next year will be around 1%, picking up thro Millennium to around trend in the second half of the year 2000. Meanwhile, we e underlying inflation to remain close to the target rate of 21/2% - though perhaps a l that rate during the course of next year. Now no-one likes to see the economy slowing d some slowdown was necessary at this point in the economic cycle in order to avo inflationary upsurge. And if in fact it proves to be as mild as most of the forecasts own - suggest, it will be a huge improvement on anything we have seen at this stage in for decades.
It is true of course that the economy may turn out to be weaker than in our central That projection is the MPC's very carefully considered view as to the most probable o but there is considerable uncertainty around it; and the risks are somewhat more on than on the upside. We don't have a crystal ball. And we don't pretend to know at all just how things will in fact turn out - that's why we publish our forecasts in the f with a wide range of uncertainty around the central case. The people to watch out for i are those who do claim to know precisely. What we have to do, in actually operating m policy is to monitor all the relevant evidence as it emerges for signs that the econom to be either stronger or weaker than we expect, and modify our view of the prosp inflation - and our monetary policy - in the light of that. And in that context assurance, which I gave recently to the TUC in Blackpool, that we will act symmetrica will be - have been - just as rigorous in reducing interest rates with the overall evid to the balance of risks to inflation on the downside, as we have been - and will ag raising rates with the evidence pointing to a significant or sustained overshoot of target.
Now there are those - perhaps even one or two of you here this evening - who rega assurance as cold comfort. It misses the point - they say - because the present ap monetary policy focuses too narrowly on inflation. What we want - they say - is a m policy which puts more emphasis on growth and employment. You hear this complaint not in this country but increasingly these days in Continental Europe. I must say, Presid leaves me totally bemused.
What it suggests is that growth and price stability are seen as alternatives - you ca more of one if you're prepared to accept a bit less of the other. I must confess that debate had advanced beyond that point and that we really had learned from bitter experi there is no trade-off of this sort. In anything other than the short term you can't hav the other.
We've tried all too often in the past to increase the growth rate of the economy pumping up demand - without sufficient regard to the underlying, supply-side, capacit economy to meet that demand. The result, repeatedly was inflationary boom followe inevitable bust, and this repeated experience itself engendered a pervasive and damagi termism, in both industrial and financial business behaviour. That simply made the worse next time around. What we - and the Bundesbank, and the ECB in future - have to do is to keep overall demand growing broadly in balance with the underlying suppl capacity of the economy, aiming to dampen rather than aggravate the economic cycle consistent price stability - certainly not falling prices but not accelerating price in is the measure of our success in achieving that broader objective over time. The deb about the ends, it is about the means. Price stability has never to my mind been simpl itself - it would be a pretty dry and unsatisfying objective if that were all that we w whole point about price stability - even when, as now, it involves a temporary slowdow growth of activity - is that it is a necessary condition for the sustainable growth o employment and rising living standards, which are of course the truly good things of which we surely all want to see. That is, I think, what we have seen over recent years.