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Reserve Bank of AustraliaMeeting account / minutesEN

Minutes of the August 2026 Monetary Policy Board Meeting

SPEAKERand Chair

PUBLISHED25/08/2026, 01:30:00
EVENT / LOCATIONNot stated

Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board Meeting

Sydney – 10 and 11 August 2026

Members present

Michele Bullock (Governor and Chair), Andrew Hauser (Deputy Governor and Deputy Chair),

Notes

  1. Marnie Baker AM, Renée Fry-McKibbin, Ian Harper AO, Carolyn Hewson AO,
  2. Bruce Preston, Iain Ross AO, Jenny Wilkinson PSM Others present Sarah Hunter (Assistant Governor, Economic), Christopher Kent (Assistant Governor, Financial
  3. Markets) Anthony Dickman (Secretary), David Norman (Deputy Secretary) Meredith Beechey Osterholm (Head, Monetary Policy Strategy Department), Sally Cray (Chief
  4. Communications Officer), David Jacobs (Head, Domestic Markets Department), Michael Plumb (Head,
  5. Economic Analysis Department) Brad Jones (Assistant Governor, Financial System), Andrea Brischetto (Head, Financial Stability
  6. Department) and Richie Evans (Acting Senior Manager, Financial Stability Department),
  7. for discussion of the item on macroprudential policy advice Financial conditions Members commenced their discussion by considering the outlook for central bank policy rates globally.
  8. Market participants expected policy rates in many advanced economies to rise over the coming
  9. 18 months, although by differing amounts. This reflected concerns about persistent underlying
  10. inflationary pressures, notwithstanding recent inflation outcomes generally having been a little lower
  11. than expected. Several central banks had already tightened policy during 2026. Members noted that
  12. expected increases in policy rates were larger where monetary policy was more accommodative, such as in
  13. New Zealand, Canada and Japan, and smaller elsewhere, such as in Australia, the United States and the
  14. United Kingdom. In the United States, resilient demand and persistent inflation had supported a higher
  15. expected path for policy rates over time, although the most recent Federal Reserve communication had been
  16. interpreted by market participants as reducing the likelihood of a policy rate increase in the near term. Yields on long-term bonds issued by governments of most advanced economies had risen since the start of
  17. the year. The rise in yields on Australian government securities had been smaller than for some other
  18. sovereign bonds. Members noted that longer term yields had risen most noticeably in the United States and
  19. Japan, reflecting a larger increase in both policy rate expectations and implied risk premia. Measures of
  20. near-term inflation compensation from shorter term bonds had eased in most countries, including
  21. Australia, as oil prices had retraced from their earlier peaks. Measures of longer term inflation
  22. compensation in Australia were still consistent with the inflation target. Members noted that aggregate volatility and risk premia in financial markets remained low, despite
  23. uncertainty associated with the conflict in the Middle East. Global equity prices had generally risen and
  24. corporate bond spreads had remained low over preceding months, supported by strong earnings and
  25. apparently limited concern among market participants about the effects of the conflict on global economic
  26. activity. Nonetheless, the equity prices of companies linked to the provision of artificial intelligence
  27. (AI) had been volatile and spreads on bonds issued by some of these companies had widened. This reflected
  28. significant fundraising for investment in AI, a reassessment of the prospective returns from investment
  29. in data centres (given broader developments in the market for AI services) and the unwinding of some
  30. highly leveraged positions in certain AI-related equities. In Australia, equity price indices had risen
  31. since May, despite a modest decline in expected earnings, though had underperformed many other markets
  32. over 2026. In China, weakness in household consumption and the property market continued to weigh on aggregate
  33. private demand. Property market weakness and slower growth in investment had also weighed on demand for
  34. steel. This had been offset by increases in public infrastructure spending and exports. The focus of
  35. authorities’ support continued to be bond-funded fiscal spending and policies directed towards
  36. advanced manufacturing, AI, robotics and green technologies. Monetary policy in China was judged to be
  37. playing a limited role in stimulating economic activity. The Australian dollar had depreciated by around 1 per cent on a trade-weighted basis since the
  38. May meeting, in response to a narrowing in yield differentials and lower commodity prices. However, it
  39. was still around 5 per cent higher than at the start of 2026. The nominal trade-weighted index
  40. remained broadly consistent with estimates of its long-run equilibrium level. As a result, it did not
  41. appear to be providing a source of variation that was additional to the standard transmission of monetary
  42. policy. Against this backdrop, members turned to consider the stance of monetary policy in Australia. Members noted that financial conditions in Australia had tightened in response to three increases in the
  43. cash rate in 2026 and were now judged by the staff to be somewhat restrictive. Banks had passed through
  44. these cash rate increases to deposit and lending rates. The current cash rate target was at the top of
  45. the range of model- and market-based central estimates of the nominal neutral rate. Medium- and long-term
  46. real interest rates derived from inflation-linked bonds were also around their highest level in over
  47. 15 years, though short-term real yields were significantly lower than long-term yields because of
  48. higher short-term inflation expectations. Members discussed the role of term premia, policy expectations
  49. and the real neutral interest rate in driving real interest rates. They concluded by noting that
  50. assessments of the neutral rate are inherently uncertain and do not provide a direct guide for monetary
  51. policy. Other indicators were also consistent with financial conditions being somewhat restrictive. Demand for new
  52. housing loans had declined significantly, particularly from investors, though liaison suggested that
  53. competition among lenders for high-quality borrowers remained strong. Housing prices were also falling
  54. after an extended period of strong growth, though this reflected a range of factors beyond monetary
  55. policy transmission alone. By contrast, business debt had continued to grow strongly despite higher
  56. borrowing costs. Business funding was still readily available from banks and capital markets. Growth in
  57. business credit had been broadly based across the business sector. Scheduled mortgage payments, as a share of household disposable income, had risen to near their 2024 peak
  58. and were expected to increase a little further as earlier increases in the cash rate flowed through.
  59. Members noted that many households with mortgages tended to have sizeable pre-payment buffers they could
  60. potentially draw upon if needed to help smooth consumption. Extra mortgage payments had eased but were
  61. still around their long-run average (as a share of disposable income). Members noted that, since May, financial markets had reduced their expectations for further monetary
  62. policy tightening, which, other things equal, would have eased financial conditions marginally. That
  63. decline followed weaker-than-expected domestic data and declines in global oil prices. Pricing implied
  64. that market participants saw little prospect of an increase in the cash rate target in August and around
  65. half a chance of a further 25 basis point increase by the end of 2026. Most market economists
  66. expected no further increase in the cash rate target, though a small number still expected another
  67. increase would be needed to stem persistent domestic inflation pressures. Some market economists expected
  68. the cash rate target to be lowered over the first half of 2027. Economic conditions Members’ discussion moved to the global economy. They began by considering developments surrounding
  69. the Middle East conflict, for which there had been some prospect of normalisation at the time of the June
  70. meeting (following the announcement of an interim peace agreement between the United States and Iran).
  71. However, the conflict was ongoing and continued to disrupt energy production and shipping in the region.
  72. Oil and most related commodity prices remained above pre-conflict levels, although they had been volatile
  73. over preceding months. Looking through this volatility, oil prices at the time of the meeting were
  74. broadly in line with the staff’s assumption in their May forecasts. However, members noted that
  75. global inventories of oil and oil products were much lower than at the start of the conflict, creating an
  76. upside risk to energy prices if supply disruptions continued. Overall GDP growth in Australia’s major trading partners had continued to be stronger than expected.
  77. For some of Australia’s Asian trading partners, the boost to manufacturing activity from global
  78. AI-related investment had been particularly pronounced and had outweighed the negative effects of the
  79. Middle East conflict and changes in US trade policy since early 2025. Members noted that higher energy prices and strong demand for goods used to develop AI services were
  80. adding to inflationary pressures in some economies. While core measures of consumer price inflation had
  81. not yet risen significantly following the onset of the Middle East conflict, members discussed the
  82. potential for these and other global developments to generate a more pronounced inflationary impulse. If
  83. so, this could push up Australian import prices and, in turn, consumer prices. Turning to the domestic economy, members noted that inflation in Australia remained well above target,
  84. even after easing unexpectedly in year-ended terms in the June quarter. The largest undershoot of
  85. expectations was in headline inflation, due to lower-than-expected retail fuel and travel prices. By
  86. contrast, underlying inflation, as measured by the trimmed mean, had increased to 3.6 per cent
  87. in the quarter, only slightly lower than expected. Members noted that the strength in underlying
  88. inflation likely reflected a combination of broad capacity pressures – as evidenced by ongoing
  89. elevated inflation for categories such as market services – and some pass-through of cost increases
  90. related to the Middle East conflict. Members noted that evidence of the pass-through of cost pressures from the Middle East conflict had been
  91. mixed. Higher input costs had contributed to increases in the prices of new dwellings in the June
  92. quarter. Elsewhere, pass-through appeared to have been a little lower in the quarter than assumed in the
  93. May forecasts. The staff continued to expect broader pass-through over coming months, reflecting
  94. prevailing capacity pressures and still-elevated short-term inflation expectations (despite some easing
  95. since the previous meeting). The potential for a more prolonged conflict in the Middle East posed upside
  96. risks to this expectation. However, the extent of pass-through would depend on the degree to which firms
  97. were constrained by customers’ price sensitivity and therefore absorbed margin pressures. Overall demand growth looked to have moderated a little since the start of the year, broadly as
  98. anticipated. As expected, underlying momentum in household consumption appeared to be easing only
  99. gradually. This was despite very weak consumer sentiment, but consistent with most households’
  100. balance sheets remaining in good shape. Business investment had increased very strongly in the March
  101. quarter, driven by growth in data centre fit-outs, and surveyed business conditions had declined only
  102. modestly since then. By contrast, conditions in the established housing market had eased by more than
  103. anticipated in May and national housing prices had declined by around 1½ per cent from their
  104. March peak. Members noted that this easing appeared to reflect the combined effect of increases in the
  105. cash rate, tax changes announced in the Federal Budget and weaker sentiment (with the relative importance
  106. of each difficult to discern precisely). They also observed that the recent easing in housing prices
  107. followed a period of very significant increases; housing prices were still around 50 per cent
  108. higher than at the onset of the pandemic and 5 per cent higher than a year earlier. In the labour market, conditions had eased by a little more over preceding months than had been expected.
  109. However, the unemployment rate remained low and conditions were still considered a little tight. Leading
  110. indicators were consistent with only limited easing in labour market conditions in the near term. Members considered the implications of these developments for spare capacity. Slower growth in aggregate
  111. demand was helping to bring potential supply and aggregate demand back into balance, but members assessed
  112. that some capacity pressures remained in the labour market and economy more broadly. That also reflected
  113. weak productivity growth, which continued to constrain the capacity of the Australian economy to supply
  114. goods and services. Model-based assessments of capacity pressures were consistent with recent information
  115. from liaison and evidence from business surveys. Firms across a range of industries reported continued
  116. labour and non-labour cost pressures and challenges sourcing suitable staff. Economic outlook Members turned to the outlook for economic activity and inflation. The outlook for near-term growth in Australia’s major trading partners had again been revised higher,
  117. the latest in a sequence of quarterly upgrades to forecasts for trading partner growth over the prior
  118. year. Those upgrades reflected both greater-than-anticipated resilience in global trade flows and a run
  119. of upside surprises in AI-related activity, which continued to drive growth in a range of high-income
  120. east Asian economies. For economies outside east Asia, growth forecasts were broadly unchanged since May,
  121. with the effects of the Middle East conflict on activity evolving largely as expected. Members noted that
  122. a combination of AI-related upside growth surprises and broader economic developments suggested that
  123. headline inflation in many economies would remain above central bank targets into 2027. This also posed
  124. an upside risk to global goods prices and, in turn, Australian import prices. The staff’s forecasts for the Australian economy were conditioned on financial market pricing for
  125. global oil prices and the cash rate. Under these assumptions, year-ended GDP growth was expected to slow
  126. over 2026 before recovering gradually over 2027 and 2028. Members noted that the subdued path for GDP
  127. growth over the forecast period was driven by both softer demand (reflecting the impact of high inflation
  128. on real incomes, easing conditions in the established housing market and the recent tightening of
  129. monetary policy) and limited growth in the supply potential of the economy. Members discussed the various
  130. interactions between housing prices and economic activity, including through dwelling investment and
  131. consumption. They also discussed the stronger outlook for business investment arising from recent and
  132. anticipated strength in investment in data centres. The forecast was for GDP growth to be below its potential rate over the forecast period. This was expected
  133. to bring the levels of aggregate demand and potential supply into balance in 2027, a little earlier than
  134. previously expected, after which some spare capacity was expected to emerge. Members noted that the
  135. forecast future level of productivity had again been revised down, reflecting productivity outcomes that
  136. had consistently been even weaker than assumed for some time and an unchanged assumption for medium-term
  137. productivity growth. Subdued GDP growth was expected to weigh on future labour demand. The unemployment rate was forecast to
  138. increase gradually to 4.8 per cent by end-2028, a little higher than forecast in May because of
  139. a higher starting point. Members noted that these forecasts suggested spare capacity in the labour market
  140. would begin to emerge from late 2027. This was expected to constrain wages growth over time, although the
  141. near-term wage forecast profile had been slightly upgraded due to a range of recent wage decisions and
  142. agreements. Headline and underlying inflation were both forecast to remain elevated in the near term. Members noted
  143. that this reflected assumptions about capacity pressures in the economy and the pass-through to consumer
  144. prices of fuel and other costs affected by the Middle East conflict. For trimmed mean inflation, the
  145. central projection was very similar to that in May. Trimmed mean inflation was forecast to remain above
  146. 3 per cent until mid-2027 and then reach around 2½ per cent in late 2027 as capacity
  147. pressures and conflict-related cost pressures ease. Members noted a range of upside risks to this
  148. projection, including: global oil prices could move even higher if the conflict in the Middle East
  149. persists or escalates; pass-through to consumer prices of cost pressures related to the conflict could be
  150. more pronounced; and domestic capacity pressures could be more enduring if the global or Australian
  151. economies receive more support from AI-related investment than anticipated or growth in domestic supply
  152. capacity proves even weaker than assumed. Members also noted potential downside risks: the labour market
  153. may be easing more quickly than assessed; activity could slow more rapidly than assumed (perhaps in
  154. response to the housing market downturn); there could be further adverse changes to global trade policy;
  155. and expected returns from AI investment could be revised down sharply. Members noted that, on balance,
  156. the staff judged the risks to be skewed to the upside. Considerations for monetary policy Turning to considerations for the monetary policy decision, members noted that data received since the
  157. previous meeting indicated that the economy was progressing towards the Board’s objectives.
  158. Inflation had eased from its peak in March and the quarterly rate of underlying inflation was slightly
  159. lower than it had been in late 2025. A little more of the tightness in the labour market had abated and
  160. the output gap was forecast to close slightly earlier than envisaged in May. On some metrics, this
  161. progress had occurred a touch more rapidly than had been expected. Nonetheless, members observed that
  162. inflation was still too high and that the economy continued to operate with excess demand. Members judged that financial conditions were somewhat restrictive, following increases in the cash rate
  163. target earlier in the year. They observed that momentum in the housing market had shifted over preceding
  164. months. Housing prices were falling in some capital cities, though this followed a long period of strong
  165. housing price growth and was being driven by factors other than monetary policy. The softening in housing
  166. demand had flowed into weaker demand for new housing loans, although growth in business credit continued
  167. to be strong. Members noted the staff forecast that inflation would decline only gradually, returning to around the
  168. midpoint of the target range by late 2027. They observed that the risks to this projection were tilted to
  169. the upside. Members acknowledged that it was difficult to incorporate some of these risks into the
  170. central forecasts, given the potentially extreme nature of their associated outcomes, but that these
  171. remained relevant to their policy decisions. They also discussed various downside risks that might
  172. provide some offset. In light of these observations, members considered whether to raise the cash rate target by 25 basis
  173. points at this meeting or to leave it unchanged for the time being. One argument to raise the cash rate target by 25 basis points at this meeting was founded on an
  174. assessment of the risks to the inflation forecast. Members noted that if the risks around the inflation
  175. forecast were judged to be significantly skewed to the upside, it may be appropriate to mitigate those
  176. risks somewhat by tightening monetary policy pre-emptively. In that regard, members discussed various
  177. upside risks, including: a prolonged conflict in the Middle East could cause oil reserves to dwindle to
  178. very low levels and oil prices to rise sharply; widespread cost pressures reported in liaison could be
  179. passed into consumer prices more fully than assumed; the AI and data centre investment boom could prove
  180. to be larger than anticipated, globally and/or in Australia; aggregate demand in Australia more generally
  181. could be more resilient than forecast; and productivity growth might not pick up as assumed in the
  182. forecasts. Members noted that the case to raise the cash rate target to mitigate some of these risks
  183. would be further strengthened if they placed greater importance on returning inflation to target no later
  184. than the extended timeframe already envisaged in the forecast profile. Members observed that the central
  185. forecast was for inflation to return only gradually to target, adding to the already prolonged period
  186. over which it had been above target. The case to raise the cash rate target at this meeting could also be further strengthened if members
  187. judged that the trade-off involved in bringing inflation down faster – namely, a
  188. sharper-than-forecast easing of labour market conditions – was perhaps gentler than in some other
  189. historical episodes, given the state of the economy and the nature of current shocks. In considering
  190. this, members noted findings from recent staff research that relatively significant movements in
  191. inflation can be associated with quite small changes in capacity utilisation when the economy is
  192. operating with limited spare capacity. Members also noted staff research that indicates short-term
  193. inflation expectations matter for inflation dynamics even when longer term expectations are anchored.
  194. They observed that both findings imply that a more pre-emptive approach to monetary policy might be
  195. appropriate when the economy is subject to capacity constraints and adverse supply shocks. In applying
  196. this to the current circumstances, members acknowledged that the global cost shock generated by the
  197. conflict in the Middle East meant some spare capacity may be necessary to bring inflation back to target. The case to leave the cash rate target unchanged at this meeting relied on forming a judgement that,
  198. following the increases in the cash target earlier in the year, monetary policy appeared sufficiently
  199. restrictive to bring inflation back to target within a reasonable timeframe, and that there was still
  200. some time to assess the accuracy of that judgement. Members noted that one argument in support of the current setting of monetary policy already being
  201. sufficiently restrictive was that the data received since the previous meeting had signalled that the
  202. economy was moving steadily towards the inflation and full employment objectives. Indeed, inflation had
  203. been a little lower than forecast (though still well above target) and the unemployment rate had risen by
  204. slightly more than expected in May. Members observed that the staff’s central forecast for inflation
  205. had it returning to around the midpoint of the target range in late 2027, under the technical assumption
  206. that the cash rate target ended the forecast period at around its current level. It was acknowledged that
  207. inflationary pressures might turn out somewhat stronger than this central case if some of the upside
  208. risks crystallised. However, this was judged to be uncertain and the near-term evolution of the economy
  209. afforded some time to leave monetary policy unchanged while assessing what incoming data reveal about
  210. these risks. Members noted that, by the following meeting, they would have received additional monthly
  211. reports on inflation and the labour market and the June quarter national accounts, while also gaining
  212. additional information about trends in the housing market and the course of the conflict in the Middle
  213. East. Another reason to leave the cash rate target unchanged at this meeting was that members might judge the
  214. risks around the inflation forecast to be balanced rather than tilted to the upside. Risks to the
  215. downside included the potential for: the labour market to be easing more rapidly than assessed; a more
  216. material adverse impact on activity from the conflict in the Middle East; a larger impact on aggregate
  217. demand from weak consumer confidence and/or the downturn in the housing market; and greater constraints
  218. on firms passing on cost pressures into final prices than expected. Having considered these various arguments, members judged it appropriate to leave the cash rate target
  219. unchanged at this meeting, while remaining alert to the upside risks to the inflation outlook and being
  220. ready to act should they materialise. Members agreed that the prevailing cash rate appeared to be working
  221. to bring the economy gradually back into balance and that the data received since the previous meeting
  222. had been consistent with this observation. The Board concluded that, in this light, there was time to
  223. assess the incoming data for signs of the risks to the inflation forecast materialising. Several members judged that it was quite possible that the upside risks to the inflation forecast would
  224. crystallise, requiring some further tightening. Other members noted the potential for downside risks to
  225. offset them. All members agreed that, given prevailing uncertainties, upcoming decisions would benefit
  226. from additional information that could strengthen their conviction about the outlook for inflation.
  227. Members agreed that further progress in delivering the outcomes envisaged in the central projection would
  228. be needed before they could be confident that inflation would return to target with the current monetary
  229. policy setting. They re-confirmed their commitment to returning inflation to target in a timely way. In finalising its statement, the Board agreed to remain attentive to the data and the evolving assessment
  230. of the outlook and risks when making its decisions. The Board will remain focused on its mandate to
  231. deliver price stability and full employment and will continue to do what it considers necessary to
  232. achieve that outcome, including increasing the cash rate target if upside risks materialise. The decision The Board decided unanimously to leave the cash rate target unchanged at 4.35 per cent. Financial stability advice to the CFR and APRA Members discussed and approved financial stability advice that the staff had prepared for the RBA to
  233. provide to the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority
  234. (APRA) at the next CFR meeting. This was in keeping with commitments made by the RBA in the CFR Charter
  235. and the Memorandum of Understanding between the RBA and APRA. Members noted that financial stability considerations were not constraining the Board’s ability to
  236. set monetary policy. While members remained alert to financial stability risks, particularly those
  237. emanating from offshore, the strong financial positions of domestic banks and most Australian households
  238. and businesses meant they are well placed to manage increased financial pressures over the period ahead. In light of the current environment and outlook, members supported APRA’s recent position to keep
  239. macroprudential policy settings unchanged. This recognised these settings’ important role in
  240. guarding against a material build-up of vulnerabilities and supporting the resilience of the Australian
  241. financial system.
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