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Reserve Bank of AustraliaMeeting account / minutesEN

Minutes of the November 2025 Monetary Policy Board Meeting

SPEAKERand Chair

PUBLISHED18/11/2025, 00:30:00
EVENT / LOCATIONNot stated

Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board Meeting

Sydney – 3 and 4 November 2025

Members present

Michele Bullock (Governor and Chair), Andrew Hauser (Deputy Governor and Deputy Chair),

Marnie Baker AM, Renée Fry-McKibbin, Ian Harper AO, Carolyn Hewson AO, Iain Ross AO,

Alison Watkins AM, Jenny Wilkinson PSM

Others present

Sarah Hunter (Assistant Governor, Economic), Christopher Kent (Assistant Governor, Financial Markets)

Anthony Dickman (Secretary), David Norman (Deputy Secretary)

Meredith Beechey Osterholm (Head, Monetary Policy Strategy), Sally Cray (Chief Communications Officer),

David Jacobs (Head, Domestic Markets Department), Michael Plumb (Head, Economic Analysis Department),

Penelope Smith (Head, International Department)

Brad Jones (Assistant Governor, Financial System), Andrea Brischetto (Head, Financial Stability

Department), James Greenwood (Deputy General Counsel) and David Wakeling (Senior Manager, Financial

Stability Department) for discussion of the item on exceptional liquidity assistance

Financial conditions

Members commenced their discussion of financial conditions by considering central bank policy settings in

advanced economies. The US Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Bank of Canada (BoC) had both cut their official

rate by 25 basis points at their October meetings, as expected, while the Reserve Bank of New

Zealand (RBNZ) had cut its official rate by 50 basis points. Members noted that inflation remained

above target in these economies. The BoC and RBNZ expected inflation to decline to their targets over the

period ahead, given significant spare capacity in their economies. The Fed had responded to weaker labour

market conditions, while noting that inflation was expected to moderate over time but with risks still

tilted to the upside.

In many advanced economies, market expectations were for policy rates to be cut further over the coming

year as economic conditions weaken. However, policy rates were expected to be steady in Canada, where

policy had already been eased significantly, and in the euro area, where the unemployment rate remained

low and inflation was close to target. The Bank of Japan was expected to raise its policy rate further in

response to persistent inflationary pressures, despite ongoing weak growth.

Members noted that the Fed had announced in October that it would conclude its balance sheet runoff. This

reflected a judgement that reserves were reaching ‘ample’ levels, given signs of pressure in a

range of US money market rates.

Sovereign bond yields had fallen noticeably in the United States, Canada and New Zealand over preceding

months, as expectations for the future path of policy rates had declined. In the United States, market

measures of short-term inflation compensation had also fallen, though longer term measures had remained

relatively stable. Long-term government bond yields in Australia were little changed.

In corporate funding markets, risk premia across equity and corporate bond markets remained low as

investors continued to price in an outlook of relatively benign macroeconomic outcomes and positive

earnings growth in several economies. US financial markets, in particular, were likely being buoyed by

expectations of policy easing by the Fed, robust corporate earnings and optimism around the potential

impact of artificial intelligence on company profits. Overall, markets appeared to be placing little

weight on risks to growth or inflation stemming from the US administration’s policies. Members noted

that a reassessment of these or other risks could prompt a sharp tightening in global financial

conditions.

In China, the property sector remained a headwind to economic growth and borrowing. Growth in total social

financing was still weak, with growth in credit to households particularly low despite the measures taken

by authorities to support lending.

Members noted that Australian financial conditions had eased over the course of the year as the cash rate

had been reduced. Cuts in the cash rate had been passed through to banks’ funding costs and lending

rates. Growth in housing prices and housing credit had picked up. This was most notable for housing

credit to investors, which tends to be more responsive to interest rate cuts than housing credit to

owner-occupiers. Business debt had continued to grow strongly.

In light of the easing in financial conditions, members considered their assessment of whether financial

conditions overall were still restrictive. A range of indicators painted a mixed picture, in contrast to

the clear signals apparent in 2024.

The market-implied path for the cash rate was within the range of model-based estimates of the neutral

cash rate, though these estimates are imprecise and do not provide any direct guide to monetary policy.

Some other indicators suggested that financial conditions could be on the accommodative side: risk premia

in capital markets were low; funding was readily available; and the spread to the cash rate for both bank

funding costs and lending rates was notably below pre-pandemic levels. These all implied that a given

level of the cash rate was less restrictive than was the case a few years earlier, consistent with some

estimates of the neutral interest rate having risen.

However, other indicators were consistent with financial conditions still being a little restrictive.

Scheduled mortgage payments remained historically high as a share of household disposable incomes, and

households were continuing to make extra mortgage payments into offset and redraw accounts at an

above-average rate. The ratio of household debt to household disposable income had continued to fall,

when adjusted for offset balances. Business indebtedness had risen, but members noted that this was

probably less about funding to increase investment and more about balance sheet and cash flow management

(as has historically been the case).

The Australian dollar had appreciated slightly on a trade-weighted basis since early August, but not

enough to alter financial conditions materially. The modest appreciation had been associated with a small

rise in the interest rate differential between Australia and its major trading partners. The exchange

rate remained within the range of staff estimates of its equilibrium level.

Members noted that market expectations for the policy rate in Australia had shifted significantly higher

since the August

Statement on Monetary Policy

. This had occurred progressively over the

period, as inflation data for the July to September period came in stronger than expected and more than

offset the response to weaker-than-expected labour force data. The market pricing used to condition the

November forecasts implied no further cuts in the cash rate in 2025, and one further cut of 25 basis

points by late 2026. More than half of market economists projected that there would be no further cuts in

the cash rate in 2025 or 2026.

Economic conditions

Members began their discussion of current economic conditions by discussing the stronger-than-expected

outcome for inflation in the September quarter. They noted that the outcomes for both headline and

underlying inflation were significantly higher than had been forecast in August, though some of this had

already become apparent from the monthly indicators ahead of the September meeting. Both headline and

trimmed mean inflation stood at or above 3 per cent.

Members observed that part of the increase in underlying inflation was accounted for by volatile

expenditure items (such as fuel and travel) or one-off factors (such as council rates) and was therefore

expected to be temporary. However, inflation had also been higher than expected across a range of

categories for which inflation is typically more persistent. This included categories such as new

dwelling costs and market services, both of which tend to reflect domestic cost pressures. Taken

together, these observations suggested that there could be a little more underlying inflationary pressure

than previously assessed.

Members observed that a range of other price indices had been signalling higher inflation in the first

half of 2025 than had been recorded in the Consumer Price Index. This included measures from the national

accounts that captured a broader span of economic activity, such as the output price deflator (excluding

agriculture and mining, given their limited influence on final prices) and the consumption deflator.

Similar developments had also been seen on the costs side: growth in the national accounts measure of

average earnings had been significantly higher than growth in the Wage Price Index; and growth in unit

labour costs had also remained high.

Members considered whether the apparently stronger growth in costs than in consumer prices could be

explained by a compression of some firms’ margins in late 2024 and early 2025, and whether any such

compression might have eased somewhat in the September quarter. They noted that such an explanation would

be consistent with the emerging recovery in private demand. It would also be consistent with underlying

inflation prior to the September quarter having been close to the staff forecasts in November 2024 but

with growth in unit labour costs having been stronger than the staff had expected. There was also direct

evidence from the housing construction industry of an earlier margin squeeze, and liaison had suggested

retailers’ margins were not under quite as much downward pressure as earlier in the year. However,

earlier margin compression was not clearly apparent from aggregate data on profits. Overall, members

concluded that the conflicting evidence did not allow for a clear assessment of the evolution of margins.

Recent data pointed to a further, and slightly faster-than-expected, easing in labour market conditions.

The unemployment rate had increased in September and both the employment-to-population ratio and the

participation rate had edged lower over prior months. The unemployment rate for young people, which tends

to be more cyclical, had also risen. Members noted signs that it was a little more difficult to find

jobs. And the changing composition of growth in activity – with slower growth in public demand and

stronger growth in private demand – was likely to have constrained growth in aggregate employment

somewhat. However, there were also signs that part of the easing in employment and the participation rate

had reflected softer labour supply, as incentives to enter or remain in the labour force had diminished

with cost-of-living pressures becoming less acute. Taking a slightly longer perspective, members observed

that the employment-to-population ratio had remained high and strikingly stable by both historical and

international standards. Timely indicators of labour demand pointed to a broadly stable outlook for the

labour market.

Members turned to consider what these data implied for capacity pressures in the economy. They noted that

the inflation outcome added weight to the possibility (identified in the August

Statement

)

that there was slightly more capacity pressure in the economy than previously assessed. Members also

noted that a range of indicators of capacity in the labour market still pointed to some remaining

tightness, notwithstanding the recent easing in the data. These included the low underemployment rate,

high level of job vacancies and the above-average share of firms reporting difficulties finding workers.

In addition, the layoffs rate had trended down and the ‘quits rate’ (the share of employees

voluntarily leaving their job) had increased recently, both of which often signal tighter conditions.

Business surveys showed that firms continued to report persistent pressures on capacity utilisation.

Members added that the possibility that capacity pressures overall in the economy were slightly more than

had been assumed was supported by findings from the annual review of the staff forecasts. That review

found that GDP growth had been a little weaker than expected a year earlier but underlying inflation had

been very close to expectations, which would be consistent with supply capacity having been less than

expected.

Members’ discussion of trends in economic activity began with developments overseas. Global growth

had so far proved more resilient than expected despite the ongoing uncertainty about global policy

measures and the rise in US tariffs. GDP growth in Australia’s major trading partners (including the

United States) had exceeded expectations in the first half of the year, trade patterns appeared to be

adjusting quite rapidly and there were signs that various tariff exemptions were reducing the cost for

exporters of the announced tariffs. In China, GDP growth had been stronger than expected in the September

quarter, as a rise in net exports more than offset weaker domestic demand, including a marked slowdown in

investment growth. The authorities had announced new policy measures to support infrastructure investment

and lift domestic demand. Iron ore and coking coal prices had increased a little, supported by resilient

underlying demand from Chinese steel mills and the announced stimulus.

In Australia, GDP growth had picked up in the June quarter and there was further evidence of the

anticipated shift in the composition of growth from public to private demand. Recent indicators pointed

to a further modest increase in year-ended growth in the September quarter, to around its potential rate.

The pick-up had been underpinned by a resumption in growth in real income as inflation eased and the

Stage 3 tax cuts took effect. Members noted that the easing in monetary policy in 2025 was unlikely

to have contributed materially to the pick-up in GDP growth at this stage. However, they observed that

the impact of the easing in monetary policy would become more material from late 2025.

Outlook

Turning to the latest projections, global growth was still expected to slow a little over the second half

of 2025 and into 2026, as higher tariffs weigh on global activity. However, the likelihood of a severe

downside scenario had diminished. The staff’s expectation was that policy support from Chinese

authorities would largely offset any further slowing in domestic demand growth in China. Inflation in

most advanced economies was expected to return to around central bank targets over the coming year or so.

Members noted that GDP growth in Australia was forecast to stabilise around its potential growth rate from

late 2025, supported by the easing in monetary policy. This forecast was conditioned on market

expectations for around 30 basis points of additional easing in the cash rate over the year ahead,

around 30 basis points less than had been assumed in the August forecasts. The expected level of GDP

at the end of the forecast period was little changed from the August

Statement

, with an

upgrade to private demand offset by a downward revision to public demand. Members noted that there were

risks to the outlook for GDP growth in both directions.

The unemployment rate was forecast to be close to 4½ per cent throughout the forecast period,

consistent with GDP growth settling around its potential rate. This forecast took account of the suite of

leading indicators of labour demand, which pointed to a broadly stable near-term outlook for labour

market conditions. Members noted, however, that there were risks on both sides of this central path.

Recent monthly outcomes for employment and the uncertain economic environment created some downside risk

to the labour market forecasts. On the other hand, the possibility of stronger-than-expected activity or

persistent weakness in productivity posed some upside risk. Members also considered the implications of

potential developments in labour supply for future capacity pressures in the labour market.

Members noted that these forecasts imply there is unlikely to be significant further easing in capacity

pressures over the forecast period if the cash rate follows the market path.

The forecast for underlying inflation over the year ahead had been revised higher since the August

Statement

. This followed the strong September quarter inflation outcome and the assessment

that there was slightly more capacity pressure than previously assessed. While the staff did not expect

quarterly inflation to be as strong in the December quarter as in the September quarter – as some

of the recent increase was judged to be due to temporary factors – underlying inflation was now

expected to be above 3 per cent until the second half of 2026. Headline inflation was expected

to be higher than underlying inflation over this time, as earlier electricity rebates end. Both headline

and underlying inflation were then forecast to be slightly above the midpoint of the target range in

2027. Members noted that this forecast was also predicated on 30 basis points of reduction in the

cash rate and that an alternative staff projection based on the assumption of no further change in

interest rates had inflation settling closer to the midpoint. The staff viewed the risks around the

inflation outlook as balanced.

Considerations for monetary policy

Turning to considerations for the monetary policy decision, members identified three judgements that were

particularly pertinent: the implications of the recent rise in inflation; the outlook for the labour

market; and whether monetary policy was still restrictive.

Regarding inflation, members noted that the increase in the September quarter had been a little larger

than expected at the September meeting and materially larger than expected in the August

Statement.

They agreed that some part of the increase in underlying inflation was likely to

be temporary. However, strength in several components pointed to the possibility that some part of the

increase might prove persistent. Members acknowledged that this could imply that there was less capacity

in the economy than they had previously judged, perhaps masked by a narrowing of margins in late 2024 and

early 2025.

In relation to the labour market, members noted the rise in the unemployment rate in September and the

associated slowing in employment growth. At the same time, they observed that forward-looking indicators

were consistent with employment growing over coming months and that the emerging recovery in economic

activity would provide some support to employment growth if sustained. A wide range of indicators

suggested that the labour market was still a little tight but there continued to be significant

uncertainty about this judgement. Members noted the staff’s forecast for the unemployment rate to be

broadly stable over the coming two years.

Members also considered the current extent of monetary policy restriction. They noted that financial

conditions had eased because of the 75 basis points of reduction in the cash rate this year, and

that there had been a contraction in bank lending spreads and risk premia in financial markets over a

longer period. The effects of the monetary policy easing earlier in the year was not yet apparent in the

data on economic activity. Members observed that there were some tensions in the signals coming from

various other indicators of the tightness of financial conditions. On balance, members judged that

financial conditions were still slightly restrictive but that it was also possible this was no longer the

case.

Members noted that the Board’s strategy over the prior year had been to ensure its decisions were

guided by the incoming data and their implications for the evolving assessment of the outlook and risks,

while remaining cautious. The Board had agreed at the September meeting that such a strategy could imply

a more gradual easing in policy than had been assumed in the August forecasts if certain conditions were

to materialise. Those conditions included growth in aggregate demand proving stronger than had been

forecast, members’ assessment of the economy’s supply capacity being lowered or members’

judgement about the extent of monetary policy restriction being reduced. Members noted that the

information received since the previous meeting had increased the probability of each of these scenarios

materialising, though there was not yet enough information to be certain. They observed that the updated

staff forecasts, which incorporated these developments and the assumption of one further reduction in the

cash rate target, were for the labour market to remain a little tight and for inflation to be above

target for a time before returning to slightly above the midpoint of the target range by 2027.

In light of these considerations, members agreed there was no need to adjust the cash rate target at this

meeting. They noted that the central projection was for the economy to remain broadly in balance, and

hence consistent with the Board’s objectives, over coming years. There were nevertheless significant

uncertainties on both sides of this baseline projection. Given that, members determined that they could

afford to be patient while assessing what the incoming data reveal about their judgements on the extent

of spare capacity, the outlook for the labour market and the degree of restrictiveness of monetary

policy.

Members discussed the developments that could materially influence their decisions at future meetings,

noting that these decisions would be driven by how the incoming data alter the outlook for the economy.

They noted several factors that could lead them to hold the cash rate target at its current level. One

such factor was if the incoming data signalled that the emerging recovery in demand was stronger than

expected, further supporting employment growth. Members noted that such a scenario could emerge in

several ways, including if global growth continued to be more resilient than forecast or if the

strengthening in household income and wealth, combined with easier monetary policy than a year earlier,

resulted in a larger-than-expected recovery in household spending. Another factor was if the incoming

data caused the Board to lower its judgement about the supply capacity of the economy. Members observed

that this could happen if inflation remained high over coming months or if productivity growth proved to

be weaker than expected. A third factor was if the Board changed its assessment that monetary policy was

still slightly restrictive. Members noted that any of these scenarios could limit the scope for further

monetary easing, particularly with inflation having been above its target for much of the preceding few

years.

On the other hand, members pointed to scenarios in which monetary policy may need to be eased further. One

scenario was if the labour market were to weaken materially from its current state. Members observed that

many indicators of the labour market had softened over the prior year. They noted the risk that

employment growth in the market sector remains soft, which could occur if the uncertain economic outlook

reduces firms’ willingness to hire or if an emerging focus on cost-cutting results in layoffs.

Alternatively, members noted that the recovery in GDP growth could prove to be weaker than expected if

households are more cautious about spending than had been assumed. In both scenarios, excess capacity was

likely to emerge and dampen inflationary pressures. If so, it would likely be appropriate to ease

monetary policy to keep inflation at target and the labour market around full employment.

Members agreed that it was not yet possible to be confident about which of these scenarios was more

likely. They affirmed that it was appropriate in this environment for the Board’s decisions to

remain cautious and data dependent. In finalising their statement, members committed to continue paying

close attention to developments in the global economy and financial markets, trends in domestic demand,

and the outlook for inflation and the labour market. The Board will remain focused on its mandate to

deliver price stability and full employment and will do what it considers necessary to achieve that

outcome.

The decision

The Board decided unanimously to leave the cash rate target unchanged at 3.60 per cent.

Exceptional liquidity assistance

As part of a series of discussions at recent meetings on the RBA’s financial stability policies,

following the amendments to the

Reserve Bank Act 1959

, members discussed the RBA’s

arrangements for exceptional liquidity assistance (ELA). The capacity to provide ELA to eligible

financial institutions that are experiencing acute liquidity difficulties but remain solvent has been a

longstanding responsibility of central banks. It reflects that, while each financial institution is

responsible for managing its own liquidity, extreme situations can arise when the provision of liquidity

to a specific institution by the central bank can be necessary to help preserve financial stability.

Given the robust regulatory frameworks for authorised deposit-taking institutions and clearing and

settlement facilities in Australia, the provision of ELA is envisaged to be exceptionally rare – as

has been the historical experience.

Members agreed that the operational arrangements for ELA would remain as before. However, a key criterion

for the Board deciding to provide ELA would be its judgement that doing so was needed to contribute to

the stability of the Australian financial system. This aligns the arrangements to the recently updated

legislated responsibilities of the RBA and the Monetary Policy Board.

Members agreed that the information on ELA arrangements provided on the RBA’s website would be

updated accordingly.

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