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Federal Reserve Bank of New YorkSpeechEN

Dudley: May You Live in Interesting Times: The Sequel

SPEAKERNot stated

PUBLISHED05/08/2008, 00:00:00
EVENT / LOCATIONNot stated

May You Live in Interesting Times: The Sequel - FEDERAL RESERVE BANK of NEW YORK

Speech

May You Live in Interesting Times: The Sequel

May 15, 2008

William C. Dudley

, Executive Vice President

Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 44th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago

Exhibits (slides)

I gave a speech last October entitled “May You Live in Interesting

Times.” In that speech I listed a number of events that I

never, ever expected to see. These included AAA-rated mortgage backed securities

selling at 85 to 90 cents on the dollar, asset-backed commercial paper backstopped

by real assets and a full bank credit support yielding more than unsecured

commercial paper issued by the same bank, and a Treasury bill auction that

almost failed at a time that there was a flight to quality into Treasurys going on.

The list has gotten much longer since then. To mention just a few: AAA-rated

collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that may turn out to be worthless; monoline guarantors, some still with

AAA ratings, but with credit default swap spreads higher than many non-investment

grade companies and a major investment bank’s demise in a few short days

in March.

The number of liquidity facilities developed and introduced by the Federal

Reserve is another list that has gotten much longer. Policymakers have

responded to the persistent pressures in funding markets by introducing several

new liquidity tools.

Today, I want to focus on what we’ve been up to in terms of these liquidity-providing

innovations. Before I begin in earnest let me underscore that my comments

represent my own views and opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views

of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or of the Federal Reserve System.

Let me first define the underlying problem. The diagnosis is important both

in influencing the design of the liquidity tools and in assessing how they

are likely to influence market conditions.

As I see it, this period of market turmoil has been driven mainly by two developments. First,

there has been significant reintermediation of financial flows back through

the commercial banking system. The collapse of large parts of the structured

finance market means that banks can no longer securitize many types of loans

and other assets. Also, banks have found that off-balance-sheet exposures—such

as structured investment vehicles (SIVs) or backstop lines of credit that are now being drawn upon—are

adding to the demands on their balance sheets.

Second, deleveraging has occurred throughout the financial system, driven

by two fundamental shifts in perception. On one side, actual risks—due

to changes in the macroeconomic outlook, an increase in price volatility, and

a reduction in liquidity—and perceptions about risks—due to the

potential consequences of this risk for highly leveraged institutions and structures—have

shifted. Many assets are now viewed as having more credit risk, price

risk, and/or illiquidity risk than earlier anticipated. Leverage is being

reduced in response to this increase in risk.

On the other side, the balance sheet pressures on banks have caused them to

pull back in terms of their willingness to finance positions held by non-bank

financial intermediaries. Thus, some of the deleveraging is forced,

rather than voluntary.

In some instances, these two forces have been self-reinforcing: In March,

the storm was at its fiercest. Banks and dealers were raising the haircuts

they assess against the collateral they finance. The rise in haircuts,

in turn, was causing forced selling, lower prices, and higher volatility. This

feedback loop was reinforcing the momentum toward still higher haircuts. This

dynamic culminated in the Bear Stearns illiquidity crisis.

During the past eight months, the financial sector as a whole has been trying

to shed risk and to hold more liquid collateral. This is a very difficult

task for the system to accomplish easily or quickly for two reasons. First,

the financial sector, outside of the commercial banking system, is several

times bigger than the banking system. So, with some hyperbole, you are,

in essence, trying to pour an ocean through a thimble. Second, this process

of deleveraging tends to push down asset prices for less liquid assets. The

decline in asset prices generates losses for financial institutions. Capital

is depleted, increasing the pressure on balance sheets.

One consequence of this reintermediation and deleveraging process has been

persistent upward pressure on term funding rates. For example,

the spreads between 1- and 3-month LIBOR and the comparable overnight index

swap rates have widened sharply during this period. The overnight index

swap rate is the expected effective federal funds rate over the stated maturity

of the swap. As shown in the two exhibits on page two, this pressure on

term funding rates has occurred in the United States, Euroland, and the United

Kingdom. It is a global phenomenon.

In fact, the increase in LIBOR to overnight indexed swap (OIS) spreads may understate the degree of

upward pressure on term funding rates. Note that after a

Wall Street

Journal

article on April 16 questioned the veracity of some of the LIBOR respondents

and the British Bankers Association threatened to expel any banks that they

discovered had been less than fully honest—LIBOR spreads increased further.

The foreign exchange swap market indicates that the funding costs for many

institutions may be even higher than suggested by the dollar LIBOR fixing. As

shown in the next slide, the funding cost of borrowing dollars by swapping

into dollars out of euros over a 3-month term is about 30 basis points higher

than the 3-month LIBOR fixing.

So what explains this rise in funding pressures more precisely? Some

have argued that the rise in term funding spreads reflects increased counterparty

risk; others that the rise stems from a reduction in appetite of money market

funds to provide term funding to banks. Over the past eight months, there

is some validity to both of these arguments. But neither explanation

provides a very satisfactory explanation.

Credit default swaps spreads for major commercial banks have narrowed considerably

over the past two months. This indicates that counterparty risk assessments

are improving—yet LIBOR-OIS spreads widened over this period. Thus,

it is hard to pin this widening in LIBOR-OIS spreads on an increase in counterparty

risk.

Similarly, the notion that money market mutual funds have lost their appetite

for term bank debt has not been particularly compelling recently. The

split of money market fund assets between Treasury-only versus prime money

market funds has been relatively stable, the weighted average maturity of the

funds has been increasing, and prime funds have increased their allocation

to both foreign and domestic bank obligations. In contrast, when there

was a flight to quality to Treasury-only money market funds last August, this

was a more compelling explanation.

So what has been driving the recent widening in term funding spreads? In

my view, the rise in funding pressures is mainly the consequence of increased

balance sheet pressure on banks. This balance sheet pressure is an important

consequence of the reintermediation process. Although banks have raised

a lot of capital, this capital raising has only recently caught up with the

offsetting mark-to-market losses and the increase in loan loss provisions. At

the same time, the capital ratios that senior bank managements are targeting

may have risen as the macroeconomic outlook has deteriorated and funding pressures

have increased.

The argument that balance sheet pressure is the main driver behind the recent

rise in term funding spreads is supported by what has been happening to the

relationship between other asset prices—especially the comparison of

yields for those assets that have to be held on the balance sheet versus those

that can be easily sold or securitized. Consider, for example, the spread

between jumbo fixed-rate mortgages and conforming fixed-rate mortgages, which

is shown in the next slide. As can be seen, this spread has widened sharply

in recent months, tracking the rise in the LIBOR/OIS spreads.

Why is this noteworthy? Jumbo mortgages can no longer be

securitized, the market is closed. Thus, if banks originate such mortgages,

they have to be willing to hold them on their balance sheets. In contrast,

conforming mortgages can be sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. Because

the credit risk of jumbo mortgages is likely to be comparable to the credit

risk of conforming mortgages, the increase in the spread between these two

assets is likely to mainly reflect an increase in the shadow price of bank

balance sheet capacity.

If this is true, then the same balance sheet capacity issue is likely to be

an important factor behind the widening in term funding spreads. After

all, a bank has a choice. It can use its scarce balance sheet capacity

to fund a jumbo mortgage or to make a 3-month term loan to another bank.

If balance sheet capacity is the main driver of the widening in spreads, this

suggests that there are limits to what the Federal Reserve can accomplish in

terms of narrowing such funding spreads. After all, the Fed’s actions

cannot create bank capital or ease balance sheet constraints materially.

That said, the Fed can reduce bank funding risks by providing a safe harbor

for financing less liquid collateral on bank and primary dealer balance sheets. Reducing

this risk may prove helpful by lessening the risk that an inability to obtain

funding would force the involuntary liquidation of assets. The ability

to obtain funding from the Fed reduces the risk of a return to the dangerous

dynamic of higher haircuts, lower prices, forced liquidations, and still higher

haircuts that was evident in March.

In essence, the Federal Reserve’s willingness to provide liquidity against

less liquid collateral allows the reintermediation and deleveraging process

to proceed in an orderly way, which reduces the damage to weaker counterparties

and funding structures. One can think of the Federal Reserve’s

actions as smoothing and extending the adjustment process—not preventing

it—so that the adjustment causes less damage to the financial system

and less pernicious macroeconomic consequences.

The Federal Reserve has introduced three new liquidity facilities during the

past five months. For depository institutions, the Term Auction Facility

(TAF) was introduced in December. This is a complement to the Primary

Credit Facility (PCF), often referred to as the Discount Window. In the

TAF, 28-day term loans are auctioned by the Federal Reserve every two weeks

in single-price auctions. Any sound depository institution with suitable

collateral can participate. A summary of the terms of the two facilities

available to depository institutions—the TAF and the Primary Credit Facility—are

shown in the next slide.

For primary dealers, we have introduced two new facilities—the Term

Securities Lending Facility and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility. The

terms for these two facilities are shown in the next slide. These can

be thought of as analogues to the TAF and the PCF for depository institutions.

The Term Securities Lending Facility auctions the right to dealers to exchange

AAA-rated residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) or asset-backed securities (ABS) collateral in exchange for Treasury securities. The

dealers take the Treasury securities obtained in the auction and use them as

collateral to obtain cash in the Treasury repo market. The bid price

is in basis points. The spread between the one-month Treasury repo rate

and the one-month term repo rate on the AAA-rated collateral is the metric

that drives the price dealers are willing to bid to swap AAA-rated collateral

for Treasuries.

The Primary Dealer Credit Facility is a standby borrowing facility for primary

dealers, akin to the Primary Credit Facility. But there are a number

of important differences. First, the PDCF, like the TSLF, is built to

utilize the infrastructure of the triparty repo system managed by the two clearing

banks—Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase. In contrast,

the PCF is administered by the 12 Federal Reserve Banks through the discount

window function. Second, the scope of eligible collateral is a

bit narrower—confined to most major types of investment grade securities. In

contrast, the discount window accepts a broader set of collateral, including

certain types of whole loans. Third, the PDCF is a temporary facility

that must, by law, disappear once market conditions normalize.

In addition to the TAF, TSLF, and PDCF, the Federal Reserve has undertaken

two other liquidity initiatives. First, the Federal Reserve has entered

into foreign exchange swaps with the European Central Bank (ECB) and Swiss National Bank (SNB). These central banks

disseminate the dollars obtained through these swaps in conjunction with our

biweekly TAF auctions. Second, the Federal Reserve has conducted a series

of 28-day term single-tranche open market repo operations. Theoretically,

these term repos can provide funding against any open market operation eligible

collateral—that is, Treasuries, Agencies, or Agency mortgage-backed securities. In

practice, the single tranche operations are used predominately to finance Agency

MBS debt because it is typically more expensive to finance than Treasury or

Agency debt in the marketplace.

So how are these facilities supposed to work? What’s the

theory? The notion is that the auction facilities should be the

main means by which the Fed provides liquidity support to depository institutions

and primary dealers. The PCF and PDCF are standby facilities designed

to provide reassurance to market participants that sound depository institutions

and primary dealers have access to backstop sources of liquidity. But

the actual amount of funds advanced through these facilities is likely to be

limited in most circumstances.

The Primary Dealer Credit Facility essentially puts the Federal Reserve in

the position of tri-party repo investor of last resort. This helps to

reassure the two triparty repo clearing banks and the triparty repo investors

that the primary dealers will be able to obtain funding. This bolsters

confidence in the triparty repo system and reduces the risk of the type of

funding run that led to Bear Stearns’ illiquidity crisis.

The auction facilities have several advantages relative to the backstop facilities. First,

they are dynamic—the results shift from auction to auction. The

information obtained through the auction process facilitates price discovery

and helps policymakers assess market conditions and sentiment. Second,

the auctions appear to have less stigma than the backstop facilities. Stigma

is the word used to describe the unwillingness to use a liquidity facility

because of fears that such use could send an adverse signal about the health

and viability of the borrower.

For the auction facilities, stigma is very low for several reasons. First,

many participants participate in the auctions. This provides cover against

the potential for an adverse signal from participation. Second, the auctions

are conducted for settlement on a forward basis. For example, in the

TAF auction, the bidding takes place on Monday and settlement on Thursday. This

time lag makes it clear that participants are not bidding because they need

immediate funds and are having serious liquidity problems.

So how have the facilities performed in practice? As designed,

most of the dollars have been disbursed via the auction facilities, the FX

swaps, and the single-tranche OMOs, rather than via the backstop facilities.

The results for the TAF auctions are shown in the next slide. As

can be seen, the spread between the stop-out rate and the minimum bid rate

has risen and fallen as term funding pressures have fluctuated over the past

five months. Interestingly, the recent expansion of the size of

the TAF program to $150 billion from $100 billion and expansion of the FX swaps

program with the ECB and SNB has led to a sharp fall in the stop-out rate.

In comparing the results of the TAF auctions to the results of the ECB and

SNB auctions, the bid-to-cover ratio in the TAF auction is currently somewhat

lower than the bid-to-cover rations in the corresponding ECB and SNB auctions.

So have the TAF and TSLF auctions been helpful in improving market function? Although

it is impossible to know what the counterfactual would have been without the

auctions, most evidence suggests that the TAF and TSLF auctions have improved

market function.

Although a recent study by John Taylor and John Williams found no statistical

evidence that the TAF auctions have had an effect on term funding, its choices

in terms of econometric design made it very difficult for this study to have

found an impact. For example, the paper tests whether there was

an impact on the spread only on the day of the auction, not before—with

the announcement—or after, when the auction results are announced or

when the auctions settle. Interestingly, minor changes in the specification

used by Taylor-Williams produce statistically significant results with the

expected sign, i.e., the TAF auctions reduced the spread.

They say that a picture is worth a thousand words. The next slide documents

the Federal Reserve’s major initiatives over the past eight months relative

to the LIBOR-OIS spread. Note that virtually all of the Federal

Reserve initiatives aimed at improving market function have been associated

with a decline in the LIBOR-OIS spread. Perhaps this just represents

an announcement or placebo effect. More study is obviously needed. However,

it is interesting that those market participants who are the patients have

been clamoring for more medicine in the form of both an increase in the size

of the TAF auctions and auctions with longer maturities.

Demand for Treasury collateral in the TSLF auctions has been less robust than

demand in the TAF, as shown in the next slide. This may reflect several

factors. Compared to other programs, the eligible collateral is narrower

and the TSLF was scaled up to a large size—$175 billion was auctioned

in the first four weeks of the program—much more quickly than the other

programs. Alternatively, the less robust demand may be due to primary

dealers’ ongoing deleveraging. Their needs for funding may be diminishing

making it easier to meet their demands in the repo market.

In addition to providing liquidity to the primary dealers, the TSLF auctions

have helped to generate a significant improvement in Treasury market function. As

shown in the next slide, prior to the first TSLF auction, overnight Treasury

repo rates were unusually low and the Treasury market was distorted by a growing

number of security fails (i.e., dealers unable to deliver promised securities)

and a large number of securities trading special (i.e., with a repo rate below

the rate on general Treasury collateral).

It will take time for market function to return to normal. The reintermediation

and deleveraging process has, in my view, a considerable ways to go. The

Federal Reserve is committed to supplying liquidity to banks and primary dealers

as needed to ensure an orderly adjustment.

Thank you for your kind attention.

May You Live in Interesting Times ››

October 17, 2007

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